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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Is it rational to do something that you have no reason to do?  Let us 
press the point: Could it be rational to do something that, on balance, 
you have reason not to do?  On the view that practical rationality simply 
is acting for reasons, this would appear to be impossible.  If there is no 
space between what you ought rationally to do and what reasons tell you 
to do, then the possibility of acting rationally, but contrary to the balance 
of reasons, is closed off.  Thus, John Gardner and Timothy Macklem 
conclude their recent analysis of this topic: “rationality . . . is simply the 
capacity and propensity to act (think, feel, etc.) only and always for 
undefeated reasons.”1
 *  Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, bruce.chapman@utoronto.ca.  The 
Author is grateful to Shachar Lifshitz, Joe Mintoff, Oren Perez, and Wlodek Rabinowicz 
for comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 




The theory of rational choice also seems to have this view about how 
reasons relate, structurally, to rational conduct, although it is not a 
theory that devotes much effort to analyzing reasons as such.  According 
to rational choice theory, reasons (which, it should be emphasized, may 
be self-interested or other-regarding, consequentialist or deontological, 
objective or subjective) ultimately give rise to a preference for doing x 
rather than y, and rational choice consists in following that preference.  It 
would be irrational, in other words, to act contrary to a preference, or 
contrary to the reason that lies behind it.  Now, this idea does commit 
the rational choice theorist to requiring something else, namely, that the 
preference relation, which is essentially binary, satisfy certain minimal 
consistency conditions when more than two alternative choices are 
involved.  For example, the preference relation must be transitive, or at 
least not cyclical.2  For if an agent, for whatever reason, preferred x to y, 
y to z, and z to x, then it would not be possible for the agent to choose 
any of these three alternatives without choosing contrary to some 
preference or the requirements of some reason.  Thus, the basis for 
imposing this formal condition of rationality, one that appears to connect 
different possible choices, is really only to meet the same fundamental 
concern identified by many theorists as essential to rationality, namely, 
that in every choice an agent must act only and always for undefeated 
reasons. 
However, if practical rationality consists of something more than 
acting for reasons, then it might be possible, rationally, to do something 
that you have no reason to do, or even that you have reason not to do.  
Suppose, for example, that practical rationality, at least in part, consisted 
of doing what “makes sense,” a point recently suggested by David 
Velleman.3  An action that does not make sense certainly looks like it 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 474 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002) (emphasis added).  We should be careful in our interpretation of this summary that 
Gardner and Macklem provide of their position on rationality and reasons.  For example, 
for them, rationality goes only to a general capacity, not a particular action.  Thus, it may 
not be that an action itself must accord with reasons if it is to be rational.  Further, in 
their view, reason-based choice need not be choice consciously guided by reason.  They 
provide examples of this being counterproductive.  Nevertheless, theirs is an analysis of 
rationality that does put reasons at the center.  For another prominent theorist of rational 
decisionmaking who seems to collapse rationality into action according to reasons, see 
JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON 1 (1999) (“Being rational is being capable of acting 
intentionally, that is, for reasons . . . .”).  See also id. at 68 (“An account of rationality is 
an account of the capacity to perceive reasons and to conform to them . . . .”).  Of course, 
Raz is also well known for allowing the possibility that rational choice can be choice 
when certain (sorts of) reasons for action are excluded.  See his discussion of 
exclusionary reasons in JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35–48 (1975). 
 2. AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 16 (1970). 
 3. See J. David Velleman, The Self as Narrator, available at http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~velleman/Work/Dennett.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2005); J. David 
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might be a promising candidate for irrationality.  Velleman seems to 
have in mind the idea that some actions might make less sense than 
others (or not make sense at all) for an agent because they are less 
coherent with other actions that the agent has already chosen.  The 
agent’s life, or at least this part of the agent’s life, would hang together 
less well as a coherent narrative for the agent if these misaligned actions 
were now the ones that the agent chose to perform.  Of course, 
independent of the prior narrative, there may be every reason to do these 
misaligned actions, and no reason not to.  But it is Velleman’s view that 
the agent, as narrator of a coherent life, will—sometimes, at least—feel 
the rational pull of these prior actions.  Therefore, it seems possible that, 
at these later moments of choice, an agent could rationally do what she 
has no reason to do, and even, perhaps, what (on balance) she has reason 
not to do. 
It will be objected, of course, that the agent’s prior decisions and 
choices simply provide reasons for the agent to carry on in a way that is 
coherent with them.  Thus, Velleman’s account of practical rationality is 
not at all inconsistent with the account that reduces rationality to acting 
for (undefeated) reasons.  But, as some recent work by John Broome 
makes clear,4 this objection confuses reasons with the normative 
requirements of practical rationality.  Unlike reasons, the normative 
requirements of practical rationality do not detach from the elements 
they hold together (for example, a series of decisions).  Thus, they do not 
give you reason to have any one of those elements (or make any one 
decision) in particular.  They only require that if you have one of those 
elements, then you must have some other one on pain of irrationality if 
you do not. 
This difference between reasons and the normative requirements of 
Velleman, Narrative Explanation, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~velleman/ 
Work/narrative.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2005). 
 4. John Broome, Normative Requirements, 12 RATIO 398 (1999) [hereinafter 
Broome, Requirements]; John Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?  And How Should We 
Cope with Incommensurable Values?, in PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCE 98, 
98–120 (Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter Broome, Are 
Intentions Reasons?]; John Broome & Christian Piller, Normative Practical Reasoning, 
in Supp. 75 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 175, 175–93 (2001) [hereinafter Broome, 
Normative]; John Broome, Practical Reasoning, in REASON AND NATURE 85, 85–111 
(José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar eds., 2002) [hereinafter Broome, Practical 
Reasoning]; John Broome, Reasons, in REASON AND VALUE: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ (R. Jay Wallace et al. eds., forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter 
Broome, Reasons]. 




practical rationality is crucially important for what practical rationality 
can achieve.  For only if the different reasons for action can be separated 
from each other by something that is itself not a reason, but is 
nevertheless a normative requirement of practical rationality, will it be 
rationally possible for an agent to follow through on rational commitments, 
rationally made.  This, we shall see, is a source of great advantage for an 
agent, although securing this advantage cannot be the agent’s reason for 
action.  Thus, the agent must secure the advantage rationally, but without 
reason. 
This Article develops this argument more fully as follows.  Part II 
begins by distinguishing reasons from reasoning, and introduces the 
possibility of having a reason to choose to do something that you have 
reason not to do.  This possibility is related to some quite conventional 
problems that the rational choice theorist faces in the theory of rational 
commitment.  As we shall see, these problems arise because the rational 
choice theorist reduces practical rationality to action according to reason.  
Part III argues that practical rationality, in addition to requiring that 
action accord with reasons, also requires that action meet certain 
normative requirements and outlines the logical difference between the 
two.  It argues that the special conceptual space that is occupied by 
normative requirements prevents the different reasons that animate 
distinct moments of decisionmaking from collapsing into one another to 
the disadvantage of the agent.  Again, the analysis, at this point, is 
related to the special difficulty of rational commitment that confronts the 
rational choice theorist.  In Part IV, I argue that the more robust model 
of rational commitment that is made possible by the idea of normative 
requirements of practical rationality should be familiar to legal theorists.  
After all, it is an idea manifested constantly in common law decisionmaking, 
where defeasible legal rules both determine cases (as a matter of 
normative requirement) and are determined by them (as a matter of 
reason), apparently simultaneously.  Thus, the distinction between reasons 
and normative requirements of practical rationality can be used both to 
prescribe a solution for a problem in rational choice—namely, the 
problem of rational commitment—and to provide structural understanding 
for what is rational in legal reason and the method of common law 
adjudication.  Part V provides some concluding remarks. 
II. REASONING, REASONS, AND RATIONAL COMMITMENTS 
All reasoning starts from an existing state of mind and concludes in a 
new one.5  Theoretical reasoning, for example, takes us from one beginning 
 5. Broome, Practical Reasoning, supra note 4, at 110. 
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state of belief to another.  If you begin by believing that Frankfurt is in 
Germany and Germany is in Europe, then theoretical reason would have 
you conclude by believing that Frankfurt is in Europe. 
Practical reasoning is said to differ from theoretical reasoning in that, 
while it might proceed partially by way of beliefs, it concludes in an action 
rather than a belief.  But that is not quite right.6  An action (at least a 
physical action) requires physical ability as well as the ability to reason.  
More generally, we might say that an action requires opportunity.  Thus, 
the most that practical reasoning can do is to take us from some existing 
state of mind to a decision or an intention to act—that is, another state of 
mind, albeit not one of mere belief.  The action itself is something that 
carries out that decision or intention and lies beyond what reasoning alone 
can do for us. 
This separation between what we decide or intend to do and what we 
actually do seems to allow for the following interesting question: Can we 
have reason to decide or intend to do something that we have no reason 
actually to do?  Notice that this is not the same question with which this 
Article began.  There the contrast was between what rationality and reasons 
might demand of us; here it is between what reasons themselves might 
demand of us at the two moments in a decision process that are opened up 
by the possibility that practical reasoning can only conclude in a state of 
mind (say, an intention) that falls short of an action. 
It should be clear to any rational choice theorist who has anguished over 
the problem of rational commitment that we can have reasons to decide or 
intend to do something that we have no reason actually to do.  More 
strongly, it seems that we can have reasons to decide or intend to do 
something that we have reason not to do.  Indeed, more specifically, we 
can have reason R to decide to do something that we have reason R not to 
do.  In other words, the same reason R can provide a rational basis both for 
choosing to do x and for not actually doing it. 
A familiar and problematic example includes my promising someone to 
do x in exchange for that person doing y (where my promise is sincere at 
the time I make it) and yet, just as rationally, not doing x when the time 
comes to execute on the promise after the other party has done y.  The 
reason for me to promise to do x is that I am better off with y being done 
(even after I incur the costs of doing x), and my promise helps to 
accomplish that; the reason not to do x is that I am (again) better off not 
 6. Id. at 85. 




doing something that it is costly for me to do if there is no further benefit to 
be secured by actually doing it.  Similarly, there can be self-interested 
reasons for me to threaten to do x should others do y, but (again) the same 
self-interested reasons not to actually do x when (despite my threat) they do 
y.  Again, the reason to make the threat is that I am better off if they do not 
do y, and my threat helps to accomplish that; but I may be better off 
actually not to carry out my threat if they do y. 
This much points to a kind of dynamic inconsistency7 in the reasons that 
we can have at different moments within a single decision process.  But 
more striking than the inconsistency itself is the manner in which the 
rational choice theorist resolves the inconsistency.  An inconsistency 
between two apparently conflicting reasons can be resolved by relaxing the 
force of one or the other, and nothing in the argument so far points us to 
any particular resolution in this respect.  However, as we shall now see, the 
rational choice theorist is inclined to give a priority to the reasons that 
agents have for particular choices over the reasons they might have had for 
a broader set of (more categorical) commitments.8  This, I suggest, follows 
from combining (1) the idea, familiar by now, that rational action is action 
according to reasons with (2) a mode of reasoning that is essentially 
inductive—that is, that begins with the rationality of a particular choice 
and, with that choice in place, goes on to build an understanding of more 
general rationality requirements as an aggregation of similar such choices.  
What is rational for the general category, therefore, is built out of what is 
rational for the particular case.  This inductive buildup from the particular 
to the general has the effect, I will argue, of displacing from our 
understanding of practical rationality anything that is different from, and 
which begins at a more general level than, the rationality of a particular 
action as one done in accordance with a reason.  In other words, inductive 
reasoning helps to fill in all of practical rationality with action done 
according to particular reasons.  Thus, it displaces from practical rationality 
the very possibility of having anything that is conceptually distinct from 
reasons, such as normative requirements. 
To see how this works, consider again the example of promising.  As we 
have seen, the rational choice theorist is committed to the general idea that 
practical rationality consists in acting according to reasons.  Of course, for 
 7. R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. 
OF ECON. STUD. 165–80 (1955–1956); Peter J. Hammond, Changing Tastes and Coherent 
Dynamic Choice, 43 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 159–73 (1976).  For a philosopher’s discussion, see 
generally EDWARD F. MCCLENNEN, RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE (1990). 
 8. For further discussion of the “particularity” of rational choice theory, and how 
this approach contrasts with the more “categorical” approach that characterizes an 
alternative tradition of rationality, see Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical 
Reason, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1169–210 (2002). 
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the rational choice theorist, reasons come mediated by preferences, and 
preferences must be transitive (or at least acyclic) if the idea of acting 
according to reasons is to be generally realized.  But this does not alter the 
basic point that rational choice cannot be choice contrary to an undefeated 
reason.  Thus, in the context of promises, it cannot be rational to carry out 
the promise if to do so at the time is contrary to preference or reason.  Now, 
this much allows us to know what the promisor might do having already 
made the promise.  But the rational choice theorist also has a way of 
determining what the promisor will choose to do at the prior moment when 
it is possible to make the promise.  As this situation has an interpersonal 
aspect, this argument appears to require that the rational choice theorist 
make a fairly sophisticated assumption about what the promisor knows or 
believes about the promisee and, more particularly, about what the 
promisor knows or believes about what the promisee knows or believes 
about the promisor.  Specifically, in these situations, the rational choice 
theorist assumes not only that all agents are rational, in the sense that they 
choose according to preference (and reason), but also that there is common 
knowledge of this rationality—namely, that each player knows that each 
is rational, and, further, that each knows that each knows this, and that 
each knows that each knows that each knows this, and so on.  Exactly 
how sophisticated this last assumption is, and how, by way of induction, it 
helps the rational choice theorist to resolve the problem of dynamic 
inconsistency, can better be seen with the help of a more detailed example. 
Imagine the following situation, which rational choice theorists 
commonly refer to as a “centipede game.”9  The bank has put out one 
hundred coins on a table.  Two players, Art and Bart, are to take turns 
removing either one or two coins from the table, each keeping all the 
 9. This game seems to originate with Robert W. Rosenthal, Games of Perfect 
Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 92, 
92–100 (1981).  For a detailed discussion of the game which reproduces some of the 
analysis presented here, see Bruce Chapman, Legal Analysis of Economics: Solving the 
Problem of Rational Commitment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 471, 475–82 (2004).  For other 
recent discussion, see Robert J. Aumann, Note, On the Centipede Game, 23 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 97, 97–105 (1998); John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Backwards 
Induction in the Centipede Game, 59 ANALYSIS 237, 237–42 (1999); Wlodek 
Rabinowicz, Grappling with the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for Bi-
Terminating Games, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 95, 95–126 (1998).  The term “centipede” is used 
because when the game is represented as a decision tree (in extensive form), the tree 
consists of a long horizontal line segment (representing the players moving through the 
game as they take only one coin) with many short downward lines (representing the 
player taking two coins and ending the game at that point), i.e., a picture of a long 
centipede with many short legs. 




coins that he removes.  The game stops as soon as either player removes 
two coins, and at that point all the coins (and only those coins) still 
remaining on the table are returned to the bank.  However, so long as 
each player takes only one coin, the game continues until all the coins 
are removed.  Potentially, therefore, each player could take one coin at 
each turn and end up with fifty coins. 
We are to imagine that Art and Bart are both rational in the sense that 
each wants to maximize his own monetary payoff from playing the 
game.  Thus, each will not choose an option, or develop a strategy, if 
there is some other option or strategy that he could choose that will give 
him more money.  Moreover, this rationality is common knowledge in 
the game in the way described above. 
Suppose Art has the first move.  The rational choice theorist’s standard 
argument, based on backwards induction, is that Art will rationally 
choose to take two coins and the game will end.  Of course, this seems a 
little problematic, even for Art; he might like to think that the game 
could have gone on a little longer so that he (and, incidentally, Bart too) 
could have picked up a few more of the one hundred coins that were 
available.  But, unfortunately, that thought has no survival value under 
the assumptions of rationality and common knowledge of rationality. 
To see why, imagine Art thinking ahead to where there are only two 
coins left on the table.  This means that, up to this point in the game, 
each player has taken only one coin and has forty-nine in his possession.  
But now Art can either end the game by taking the two coins that remain 
or take only one and allow the game to end with Bart taking the only 
coin that is left.  Clearly, the first option provides a higher payoff for Art 
and, therefore, is the rational option for him.  So that is the option he 
chooses on this play of the game and the game ends. 
But now consider Bart thinking ahead to where there are three coins 
on the table—that is, to the penultimate play in the game just before the 
one imagined by Art in the previous paragraph.10  Since, under the 
assumption of common knowledge of rationality, Bart knows that Art is 
rational, he knows what Art will do in the next play of the game should 
Bart choose only one coin and the game move on to that next (and 
ultimate) stage.  But Bart can do better than that by taking two coins at 
this penultimate play, thereby stopping the game.  So, being rational, 
that is what Bart chooses to do.11
 10. Or, more accurately, consider Art thinking this about Bart.  For all of this 
thinking is really going to an explanation of why Art, who has the first move in the 
game, will choose to take two coins on the first move.  So it is really a question of what 
Art is thinking about what Bart is thinking (about what Art is thinking, etc.).  All this is 
made possible by common knowledge of rationality. 
 11. There is of course a problem here that more than a few commentators have 
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Now, of course, this last choice by Bart is perfectly predictable by Art 
(again, given common knowledge of rationality), and so Art will 
anticipate at the pre-penultimate play of the game, when there are four 
coins still on the table, that Bart will end the game at the next 
penultimate play.  So, given that he is rational, Art will choose to do 
better by taking two coins rather than one at this pre-penultimate point, 
thus ending the game.  And so on.  We must conclude, therefore, that 
under this sort of inductive reasoning, and these assumptions, the game 
will end on the first play when Art takes two coins, leaving the other 
ninety-eight to be returned to the bank. 
Does anything change if each player, at the beginning of the game, 
promises the other to only take one coin throughout the game?  We can 
certainly see that each player has a reason for wishing that he could 
make such a sincere and credible promise (i.e., a promise that the other 
player could rationally believe).  After all, each would be so much better 
off if, by promising, each could induce the other to behave according to 
their respective promises; each would have fifty coins rather than Art 
having two and Bart having none.  But the backwards induction 
argument, based on the assumptions that each player is rational and that 
this rationality is common knowledge, prevents the promise from being 
noticed.  For the players to reach this point in the game, where there are only three coins 
remaining on the table, each player must have chosen not to terminate the game; that is, 
each must have chosen to remove only one coin at all the prior turns.  But, as the 
backwards induction argument goes on to show (under the assumptions of rationality and 
common knowledge of rationality, assumptions that the players themselves can use to 
generate the argument), to remove only one coin on one’s turn is not rational.  Thus, at 
the point when there are only three remaining coins on the table, for Bart to hypothesize 
that Art will remove two coins on his next move (should Bart take only one coin and 
allow the game to continue on to that next move) is for Bart to hypothesize that Art is 
rational on this next move even though, also by hypothesis, Art has shown no such 
rationality in the game so far.  Is it plausible for Bart to have, or to hypothesize having, 
such a resilient (i.e., contrary to fact) belief in Art’s rationality?  Indeed, is it plausible 
for Bart to anticipate acting rationally on his own turn having himself acted irrationally 
in the game so far?  More generally, is it plausible to argue or hypothesize, at any turn in 
the game, that the player (whose turn it is) will either act rationally at this turn, or believe 
the other player will act rationally on the next turn, if this turn could not have been 
reached except through irrational play either by himself or the other player (or both) at 
some point earlier in the game?  For good discussion of this difficulty in the backwards 
induction argument, see Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden, The Backward Induction 
Paradox, 86 J. PHIL. 169, 169–82 (1989).  For a reconstruction of the argument that 
cleverly avoids this problem, at least at a formal level (by building in the assumption that 
all players believe that any turn in the game, if it is actually reached, must have been 
reached only by way of rational choices), see Broome & Rabinowicz, supra note 9, at 
238–39.  Also, for a similar argument, see Aumann, supra note 9, at 103. 




credible.  Each player knows, under these assumptions and regardless of 
what has been promised by the other player, that it is rational for the 
other player to end the game on the next move should he, himself, 
choose, according to his promise, not to end the game by only taking one 
coin.  Thus, it is pointless for each player to believe the other’s promise, 
and just as pointless, therefore, for each player to make it. 
The rational choice theorist, therefore, resolves the dynamic inconsistency 
of having a reason to make a sincere promise that one has no reason to 
perform by denying the feasibility of making such a promise at all.12  
Without any real opportunity to make such a promise, there is nothing to 
which reason can attach.  And, therefore, there is nothing to which a 
reason for not performing the promise can attach either.  Now, by 
obliterating both of the inconsistent elements that make it up, this might 
appear more to dissolve the possibility of dynamic inconsistency 
altogether, rather than resolve it in some particular way by privileging 
one of the inconsistent elements.  But it is clear from seeing how the 
backwards induction argument actually works that the dissolution is 
driven by (1) beginning with the reason that attaches to removing two 
coins at any particular choice in the game, particularly the last possible 
choice, (2) holding constant to the rationality of that choice (and each 
player’s knowledge of its rationality) as one considers other prior 
choices, and then (3) generalizing to all prior (like) choices the same 
rationality that requires the agent to choose according to reason on the 
last possible choice.  Thus, the dissolution of the dynamic inconsistency 
is clearly based on privileging the reason that attaches to not performing 
the promise, showing then (under the common knowledge assumption) 
that the prior making of the promise is without reason, and, only then, 
showing that there is nothing to which the reason for nonperformance 
can actually attach.  This effectively resolves the dynamic inconsistency 
by privileging the reason not to perform the promise over the reason that 
one originally had to make it. 
Because, under the assumptions of rationality and common knowledge 
of rationality, the players do so much worse for themselves as compared 
to how they might otherwise have done, the backwards induction 
argument has been thought to be somewhat paradoxical.13  Apparently 
acceptable assumptions, combined with an apparently acceptable 
argument, have led us to an apparently unacceptable conclusion in terms 
 12. MCCLENNEN, supra note 7, at 200–18. 
 13. Even prominent game theorists concede this.  See Reinhard Selten, The Chain 
Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 138 (1978) (arguing that the backwards 
induction argument provides a “game theoretically correct” answer for how rationally to 
play the game, but conceding that other ways of playing seem “to be the better guide to 
practical behavior”). 
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of the payoffs that individually rational players secure.  Moreover, there 
seems every reason to think that, in fact, two rational players in such a 
game would not actually play the game in the way that the backwards 
induction argument suggests.  To accommodate this last point, the 
rational choice theorist’s typical response has been to change the 
common knowledge of rationality assumption.14  That is, we will see the 
players play this game longer, and more profitably, the argument goes, 
because it cannot be assumed that each player knows that each player is 
rational, or that each knows that each knows that each is rational, etc.  
This change in the common knowledge of rationality assumption will 
allow Art (or Bart) to entertain, at least, the thought that at some point in 
the game he should take only one coin because the other player will not 
necessarily respond by taking two coins and end the game in the next 
round of play.  Predicting at what point exactly the game might end 
depends on the precise details of how the common knowledge 
assumption is relaxed, and need not detain us here.  The important point 
is that a relaxation of this assumption allows us to comprehend the 
thought that the players might play the game more profitably than they 
do under the strictest version of the backwards induction argument that 
is implied by assuming common knowledge of rationality. 
Moreover, as an empirical matter, it does seem implausible to think 
that the players would actually have common knowledge of rationality.  
After all, such an assumption requires each player to know a great deal 
about the other player’s rationality and, further, about the other player’s 
knowledge about one’s own rationality.  Indeed, it requires a player to 
know about the other player’s knowledge about one’s own knowledge 
about that player’s rationality (and so on)!  As the demands of common 
knowledge grow through these different levels, the assumption that there 
could actually be the sort of interpersonal transparency that is required 
seems more and more strained.  And so, it seems reasonable to the 
rational choice theorist to relax the common knowledge of rationality 
assumption.15
 14. See, e.g., David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 246 (1982) (“[W]e are able to show that 
certain kinds of informational asymmetries must yield a significant measure of 
cooperation in equilibrium, and that other plausible asymmetries may produce 
cooperation as well.”). 
 15. The economist seeks to relax the common knowledge assumption to explain 
the fact that players do not play the game in the way that the backwards induction 
argument suggests.  Thus, while the argument might not apply as a contingent matter of 




But I want to suggest now that the backwards induction argument does 
not depend so essentially on this sort of interpersonal knowledge.  The 
argument, for all intents and purposes, will go through just as well if an 
agent is only required to have a sound knowledge of his own rationality 
and, in particular, if it is assumed that an agent knows that he cannot 
rationally intend or plan to do what he knows he will not rationally do 
(when the occasion arrives for him to act on that intention).  To see this, 
consider the following variation on the centipede game.16  Suppose 
Perfectly Reliable Bart makes the following offer to Art: that at any 
point n in the game where it is Bart’s turn he (Bart) will take only one 
coin so long as Art can form the intention at n to take only one coin on 
the next play of the game, n+1, when it is Art’s turn.  Bart is assumed 
here to be perfectly reliable in the sense that he always takes one coin at 
n on observing that Art has formed the requisite intention at n.  Thus, 
there is no question here of Art having to make any difficult assumptions 
about Bart’s rationality, let alone any higher level assumptions about 
Bart’s knowledge of Art’s rationality or, further, about Bart’s knowledge 
about Art’s knowledge about Bart’s rationality.  And, likewise, Bart 
does not need to know any of this about Art, although, for the purposes 
of the argument, Bart does need to be able to observe Art’s intentions at 
any play of the game.17
Consider again the problem from Art’s point of view.  A new offer 
from Bart is only worthwhile to Art if he can form the requisite intention 
at that point to take only one coin on the next play of the game.  But, at 
Art’s last possible move in the game, when there are only two coins left 
on the table, Art knows he will take both of them (after all, there is no 
possibility at this point of getting any new offers from Bart, and rational 
behavior, we assume, consists of maximizing one’s monetary payoff).  
fact, it is not as if they think there is any thing problematic with the argument, as such.  
Philosophers confronting the backwards induction argument are more inclined to think 
that there is something necessarily (not just contingently) wrong with the argument itself.  
Graham Priest has also noted that there is this difference in approach between philosophers 
and game theorists more generally.  Graham Priest, The Logic of Backwards Inductions, 
16 ECON. & PHIL. 267, 267–68 (2000).  For a good review of the broad range of 
philosophical arguments dealing with backwards induction, most of them dealing with 
so-called surprise exam paradox, see generally ROY A. SORENSEN, BLINDSPOTS (1988). 
 16. This is a version of the variation introduced by SORENSEN, supra note 15, at 
337.  It builds on a problem about intentions introduced by Gregory Kavka.  Gregory S. 
Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33, 33–36 (1983). 
 17. Of course, there might appear to be something implausible about assuming that 
one person can observe another’s state of mind, e.g., another person’s intentions.  But 
not even this is really necessary.  What is needed is only that Art believes this about Bart.  
However, as I hope now to suggest with this variation on the original example, the real 
implausibility of the backwards induction argument does not seem to turn on the 
particular version of interpersonal transparency that is used.  The real problem appears to 
be in the notion of individual rationality that is being assumed. 
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Thus, he knows, by assumption, that he cannot form the requisite 
intention at the move before this, when there are three coins on the table 
(and where it is Bart’s move), to take only one coin on the next move.  
Thus, he knows that an offer from Bart at this point is worthless to him.  
But then, he asks himself, why not take two coins on the move (his 
second last possible move) just before this move by Bart?  Art would 
only not take two coins if, by taking one coin instead, he could again get 
Bart to make a worthwhile offer to him at the next move.  But Art has 
already concluded that such an offer is worthless to him because he 
cannot form the requisite intention to make it worthwhile.  So Art knows 
that it is pointless to take only one coin on his second to last move; he 
should take two.  But then, of course, he cannot form the requisite 
intention at Bart’s immediately prior move to take only one coin.  And 
so Bart’s offer to him at that point is also worthless.  But why then, he 
asks himself again, should he not take two coins at his third last possible 
move?  To take only one coin at this point only generates another 
worthless offer.  In like manner, it can be shown that all the prior offers 
that Bart might make to Art are worthless and that, as a consequence, 
Art will take two coins on the first move of the game.  And none of this 
argument makes any general demands on Art’s knowledge of Bart’s 
rationality or vice versa.  All that is required is that Art know that he 
cannot form an intention to do something that he knows he will not 
rationally do. 
This last requirement seems acceptable in general, but particular 
interpretations of it might not be.  The real force of the requirement is in 
the idea that a rational agent cannot intend to do what he knows he will 
not do.  But how does he know that he will not do it?  Because, the 
argument goes, he knows that it will be irrational for him to do it.  So 
far, so good; this much also seems acceptable.  The difficulty arises on 
the interpretation of practical rationality that is used.  If practical 
rationality means, simply, acting for (undefeated) reasons (and in 
rational choice theory this means acting according to reasons as 
manifested in preferences, all things considered), then the requirement 
reduces to the idea that a rational agent cannot intend to do what he 
knows he has reason not to do.  For then he knows he will not do it, and 
this contradicts the real force of the requirement.  But suppose that there 
was more to practical rationality than acting for reasons.  Then it would 
be possible for a rational agent to intend to do something that he had 
reason not to do.  Why?  Because then he might not know that he would 




not rationally do it even though he knew he had reason not to do it.  And 
without the knowledge that he might not rationally do it, he could intend 
to do it in a way that is consistent with the real force of the requirement. 
Thus, the possibility that there is more to practical rationality than 
acting for reasons opens up the further possibility that an agent can 
intend to do what he has reason not to do.  Again, it is worth emphasizing 
that this is not the same as saying that he can have a reason to intend to 
do something that he has reason not to do.  That was the possibility with 
which we began our investigation in this Part of the Article.  And we 
saw fairly quickly that an agent could have such countervailing reasons; 
the examples of the centipede game and of promising seem to establish 
this point in a practically important way.  What was problematic for the 
agent, however, was whether the reasons that he had for his prior 
intentions or promises could ever be made effective: could he actually 
form these intentions, or make these promises, if he had reason actually 
not to do as he intended or promised?  The backwards induction 
argument, as applied to intentions (in the intrapersonal knowledge case) 
and promises (in the interpersonal knowledge case), suggested not.  But 
now we can see that this argument turns on the same assumption that we 
have been questioning all along—namely, that practical rationality 
consists only in acting for reasons.  For only then does the real force of 
the more general requirement—that an agent cannot rationally intend or 
plan to do what he knows he will not rationally do—reduce to the more 
particular idea that an agent cannot rationally intend or plan to do what 
he knows that he will have reason not to do.18
The suggestion here is that we should accept the real force of the 
general requirement, but not the particular interpretation of that idea that 
drives the backwards induction.  That is because there is something more 
 18. In some very helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article, Wlodek 
Rabinowicz questioned whether it was plausible to impose this general requirement (viz., 
that an agent cannot rationally intend or plan to do what he knows he will not rationally 
do).  He suggested that even if an agent knew that he would not do x rationally when the 
time came actually to do it, the agent could nevertheless rationally intend or plan to do x 
if it was thought that forming the intention or plan would make it more likely that x 
would actually be done (albeit not rationally).  It may even be that Ulysses binding 
himself to the mast to overcome (nonrationally) the lure of the Sirens provides us with a 
classic example of such an effective and rational plan.  However, in this sort of example, 
it seems that the physical restraint rather than the intention itself is doing the work to 
hold the agent to the plan.  If Rabinowicz means to suggest that the mere fact of having 
adopted the intention or the plan, without more (such as using physical restraints, giving 
up hostages, etc., measures which either avoid the influence of reasons or change their 
balance at the moment of acting) can make it more likely that the act will be done, then 
he is closer to the structure of the problem being analyzed here.  But then, as this Article 
will go on to argue in the next section, I am inclined to say that an act carried out under 
the normative requirements of an adopted intention or plan is rational rather than 
irrational. 
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to practical rationality than acting for reasons.  I hope that this Part of the 
Article has given us some indication of why it might be important that 
there is something more.  The next Part of the Article will tell us more 
specifically what that something more is. 
III. THE NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY 
Let us begin by reconsidering our earlier example of theoretical 
reasoning.  Theoretical reasoning, it is said, takes us from one belief 
state to another.  Thus, if you begin by believing the proposition that 
Frankfurt is in Germany (FG) and the proposition that Germany is in 
Europe (GE), then theoretical reason would have you conclude by 
believing the proposition that Frankfurt is in Europe (FE).  Suppose that 
you do in fact believe FG and GE.  Does this mean that you have a 
reason to believe FE?  You may have reason to believe this (as it 
happens you do!), but not because of your beliefs about FG and GE.  In 
fact, you might have no reason at all to believe FE or only have reasons 
not to believe FE.  Thus, while it is true that if you believe FG and GE, 
you should then believe FE, there is nothing in this that gives you any 
reason to believe FE. 
To see why, consider this alternative example.  Suppose that you 
believe the proposition that Toronto is in Germany (TG) and the 
proposition that Germany is in Europe (GE).  Then, theoretical reason 
would have you conclude by believing the proposition that Toronto is in 
Europe (TE).  But you have no reason, based on these beliefs, to believe 
TE.  Indeed, you have many other reasons, independent of these beliefs, 
not to believe TE.  And it is not that these other reasons, based on 
independent beliefs, simply prevail over, or outweigh, the reason you 
have to believe TE based on your beliefs in TG and GE.  Rather, it is 
that there simply is no such reason to believe TE at all.  Any independent 
reason not to believe TE would be enough to provide an all-things-
considered reason not to believe TE, at least if the only “reason” that you 
claimed for believing TE was your belief in TG and GE.  This suggests 
that the weighing of conflicting reasons simply has no application here.  
The beliefs in TG and GE add nothing to the balance of reasons for 
believing TE. 
But there does seem to be some sort of normative connection between 
believing TG (or FG) and GE and believing TE (or FE).  What is that 
connection if it is not that believing the first two propositions provides a 
“reason” for why you should believe the third?  John Broome provides 




an answer.19 Although your beliefs in the first two propositions provide 
no reason for you to believe the third, they do normatively require you 
to believe the third.  Normative requirements differ from reasons, says 
Broome, in that they are strict and relative.  They are strict because, in 
the context of theoretical reasoning, they really do require or obligate 
you to the conditional that if you believe TG and GE, then you should 
believe TE.  If you believe TG and GE, but do not believe TE, then you 
are not entirely as you should be; in particular, you have failed to meet 
the normative requirements of rationality (here, the requirements of good 
theoretical reasoning).  But these requirements, while strict, are relative 
because they do not detach from the conditional proposition “if . . . , 
then . . .” and, therefore, do not give you any reason to believe TE tout 
court. 
Reasons, on the other hand, are not relative in this way; they do detach 
and do give independent reasons, say, to believe TE (e.g., perhaps a very 
reputable geographer told you that TE).  But these reasons are not strict; 
they are only pro tanto.  That is, while you might have this independent 
reason to believe TE, it still might be that you do not believe it, perhaps, 
because you have some other independent stronger reason for not 
believing it (e.g., that TE goes against everything you were taught in 
school).  However, because reasons are not strict, not believing what you 
have a reason to believe is quite consistent with being entirely as you 
ought to be.  While there might be a reason to believe TE, the balance of 
independent or detached pro tanto reasons might be such that you do not 
believe TE.  That is no problem. 
Reasons, therefore, are weaker than normative requirements in being 
only pro tanto and not being strict.  But they are stronger than normative 
requirements in being independent rather than relative.  These are 
differences that go to the very logical structure of each.  We are now 
ready to see how these important logical differences are relevant to 
practical reasoning and what they can do for an agent. 
Practical reasoning, as I have already said, differs from theoretical 
reasoning in that it concludes in a state of mind that involves a decision 
or intention (usually, to act) rather than a belief. 20  Here is an example: 
(1) I intend that (I will visit Heidelberg); and  
(2) I believe that (to visit Heidelberg I need to fly to Germany); 
and so 
(3) I intend that (I will fly to Germany). 
 19. Broome, Requirements, supra note 4, at 401; Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?, 
supra note 4, at 105. 
 20. Broome, Normative, supra note 4, at 175. 
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The bracketed propositions provide the content for the different 
statements and the prior nonbracketed terms reveal my state of mind, or 
attitude, with respect to each of the propositions.  The logic of the 
reasoning is contained in the propositions themselves.21  We can see this 
if we think of these same three propositions under the aspect of 
theoretical reasoning, where only belief states of mind apply.  If I 
believe the bracketed proposition in (1) and the bracketed proposition in 
(2), then the “and so” logic of theoretical reasoning will have me 
conclude that I believe the bracketed proposition in (3).  In the practical 
reasoning that is described by the above example, the same “and so” 
logic applies, although now it takes us from an intention state of mind in 
(1) and the belief state of mind in (2) to the concluding intention state of 
mind in (3). 
We can now pose questions about practical reasoning that are fully 
analogous to the ones that we posed earlier about theoretical reasoning.  
Does my prior intention in (1) together with my belief in (2) give me any 
reason for my final derivative intention in (3)?  No, not any more than 
the same logic applied to the following three statements would give you 
any analogous reason to have the derivative intention in (6) in this 
example: 
(4) I intend that (I will visit Heidelberg); and  
(5) I believe that (to visit Heidelberg I need to fly to Canada); 
and so 
(6) I intend that (I will fly to Canada). 
The prior intention in (4) together with the belief in (5) gives me no 
reason to have the derivative intention in (6). 
Nor is any reason that I might have for my prior intention in (1) (or in 
(4)) transferred by the logic of practical reasoning into a reason for me to 
have the final intention in (3) (or in (6)).  I may have independent pro 
tanto reasons to intend to fly to Canada or not to fly to Canada, and what 
I have most reason to do in that respect will be determined by the 
balance of these independent reasons.  However, the fact that I have a 
reason to have the intention in (1) (or (4)) will add nothing to the 
balance. 
But it is true that I am normatively required to have the intention in 
(3) (or in (6)) if I have the intention in (1) (or in (4)) and the belief in (2) 
 21. Broome, Practical Reasoning, supra note 4, at 89. 




(or in (5)).  While relative in this way, this normative requirement of 
practical rationality is, as all such normative requirements are, strict.  In 
other words, if I do have the intention in (1) (or in (4)) and the belief in 
(2) (or in (5)), then, if I do not have the intention in (3) (or in (6)), I am 
not entirely as I should be.  In particular, I have failed to meet the 
normative requirements of practical rationality. 
These are, by now, familiar enough points.  So let us add a little 
conflict into the mix.  Suppose that I do have the intention in (1) and the 
belief in (2).  Then, I am normatively required to have the intention in 
(3).  If I don’t, I am not entirely as I should be.  But suppose that I have 
an independent reason not to have the intention in (3) and, further, no 
independent reason to have it (perhaps there is a strike by air traffic 
controllers in Germany, making any flight to Germany less safe).  Then 
the strict normative requirements of practical rationality are in conflict 
with my independent pro tanto reasons.  Am I still entirely as I should 
be?  It seems not.  Something is wrong here and needs sorting out. 
Here is where the relative quality of normative requirements of 
practical rationality can be useful.  The strict quality of these normative 
requirements obligates me to have the derivative intention in (3), but 
only if I have the prior intention in (1) and the belief in (2).  Thus, I can 
satisfy these strict requirements either by accepting the antecedent 
conditions of the conditional and accepting the consequent (modus 
ponens), or by rejecting the consequent and rejecting one or other (or 
both) of the antecedent conditions that require the consequent (modus 
tollens).  The fact that I have an independent reason for rejecting the 
consequent seems to provide me with some motivation for the second 
method of satisfying the normative requirements of practical rationality.  
Then, I could satisfy both my independent reason for not having the 
intention in (3) and the strict normative requirements of practical 
rationality.  And, after this adjustment, I would be entirely as I should 
be. 
Suppose, as seems reasonable, I cannot adjust my beliefs in (2).22  
Then, to make the necessary adjustment, I would need to change or 
repudiate my prior intention in (1).23  But that does not seem problematic, 
at least on the argument so far.  So far I have not provided any reason for 
 22. On the difficulty of deciding to believe, see BERNARD WILLIAMS, Deciding to 
Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136, 136–51 (1973) (describing the dilemma of 
whether belief can be related to decision and will). 
 23. Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?, supra note 4, at 112.  Note that, for 
Broome, repudiation is more than merely ceasing to have the prior intention, but it might 
not require a reason either.  For suppose there was no reason for the prior intention.  
Why, then, should it take a reason to give it up?  Broome requires repudiation to be 
deliberative, but not necessarily with reason, something that is a little mysterious. 
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my prior intention in (1); there is only the fact that I have it.  But it 
seems implausible that the mere fact of having this prior intention could 
count for much if I have an independent reason not to have the 
derivative intention in (3).  This is consistent with the insight that a prior 
intention in (1), together with the belief in (2), gives me no reason to 
have the derivative intention in (3).  Thus, while the normative 
requirements of practical rationality strictly require me to have the 
intention in (3) if, as a matter of fact, I have the intention in (1), they do 
not provide much normative resistance against my changing that fact by 
repudiating the intention in (1). 
What if you had no reason to adopt the prior intention and no reason 
not to follow through on it by adopting the derivative intention?  Does 
this mean that you ought to satisfy the normative requirements of 
practical rationality by accepting the antecedent conditions of the 
conditional and accepting the consequent?  John Broome thinks not; you 
are still at liberty to repudiate the prior intention and deny the 
consequent.  If there was no reason to adopt the prior intention in the 
first place, there is no reason not to repudiate it.24  Yet he provides an 
interesting example that, ironically, goes some part of the way towards 
challenging the rationality of his approach.25  While the example is 
somewhat special, it sets the stage, I believe, for thinking that there 
might be something irrational in always repudiating the prior intention 
and, more particularly, in repudiating it in those cases where one has a 
reason in favor of a prior intention and a reason against the derivative 
intention.  The latter, of course, are the cases most analogous to those we 
saw earlier when we discussed whether you might have a reason to 
choose to do something that you have reason not to do—namely, the 
sorts of situations captured by the centipede game and promising. 
Broome’s example, borrowed from Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 
turns on the idea that certain values are incommensurable.  We are to 
imagine the situation where God has told Abraham to take his son Isaac 
to the mountain and sacrifice him there.  The options at the moment of 
prior intention are either to intend to obey, thereby showing one’s 
submission to God, or intend to disobey, thereby saving Isaac’s life and 
preserving one’s relationship with him.  Broome argues that the values 
here are incommensurable, something that does make sense of these 
 24. Id. at 118. 
 25. Id. at 114. 




situations (and other such tragic choices26) as posing a moral dilemma 
for the protagonist.  Neither option is better than the other, nor are they 
equally good.  For some theorists, this is simply what incommensurability 
means.27
Yet, Abraham must decide.  Because the options are incommensurable, 
there is no reason to decide in favor of either one of the options rather 
than the other.28  As we know from the story, Abraham decides to obey 
God and sets out for the mountain.  But now, suppose that, at any 
point—say, at the foot of the mountain—he can change his mind and 
repudiate his prior intention.  Is there any reason not to?  If the values 
continue to be incommensurable, the answer is presumably not.  So, this 
is a situation where, first, there is no reason to adopt the prior intention 
to obey God rather than save Isaac and, second, no reason to carry out 
that prior intention as a derivative intention rather than not carry it out 
under a repudiation of the prior intention.  Because of the incommensurability 
of the values, the balance of pro tanto reasons has no role here. 
Yet, simply because one has already formed the prior intention, there 
might be something problematic in repudiating it, a point Broome 
explicitly recognizes.29  For by adopting the prior intention and then 
repudiating it, Abraham has ended up taking a course of action that is 
worse than another course of action that he could have adopted by never 
adopting the prior intention in the first place.  Had he never adopted the 
prior intention to obey God, he would, of course, have given up the 
value that was contained in that option.  But, at least, he would have 
preserved all that was valuable in his relationship with Isaac.  However, 
by adopting the prior intention and then repudiating it at the foot of the 
mountain, Abraham has both given up the value of obeying God and 
sacrificed something of his relationship with Isaac.  Thus, although 
neither of his decisions (for one option rather than the other) was wrong, 
or against reason (again, because these values are incommensurable), the 
 26. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18 (1978) (pointing 
to the inability to reconcile deeply incommensurable values).  Great tragedy more generally 
makes much of these moments of choice between the seemingly incommensurable—e.g., 
Antigone’s choice between the obligations of citizenship and the obligations to her dead 
brother or Agamemnon’s choice between his daughter and his obligations as a military 
leader, etc.  See SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 56 (Richard Emil Braun trans., 1973); AESCHYLUS, 
AGAMEMNON 26–29 (Hugh Lloyd-Jones trans., 1970). 
 27. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986). 
 28. This is not to say that there are no reasons for choosing one or the other.  
Indeed, that there are such reasons is the source of the dilemma.  However, while there 
are reasons for choosing the one option and reasons for choosing the other, because of 
the incommensurability there are no reasons for choosing the one rather than the other.  I 
am grateful both to Shachar Lifshitz and to Wlodek Rabinowicz for encouraging me to 
clarify this point. 
 29. Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?, supra note 4, at 116–17. 
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two decisions together add up to a course of action that was worse for 
him (and, incidentally, for Isaac) than one he could have chosen.  And 
this last assessment is one we can make despite the incommensurability 
of the values; the course of action finally chosen is no better for the 
value of obeying God and worse for the value of preserving the 
relationship with Isaac. 
Had Abraham not repudiated his prior intention, then he would have at 
least achieved the value of obeying God (which he had no reason not to 
do).  Thus, a resolute commitment to carry out his prior intention allows 
Abraham to avoid a bad outcome in a way that his repudiation of that 
prior intention does not.  Broome concedes this, but does not consider it 
irrational for Abraham to repudiate the prior intention.  Why?  Because, 
he says, there was no reason, at either of the two points where a decision 
had to be made, not to make the particular decision that was made.  
Thus, since no particular decision was ever made contrary to reason, 
there was no irrationality in the overall course of action. 
This comes very close to reducing practical rationality to action 
according to reason, something that Broome has been very careful to 
avoid.  Of course, Broome is not, strictly speaking, guilty of this 
reduction.  After all, at the base of the mountain, when Abraham decides 
to turn back from the sacrifice, Abraham is also obliged to repudiate his 
prior intention so that the normative requirements of practical rationality 
are met.  Nevertheless, Broome’s willingness to count repudiation as a 
course of action that is as rational as being resolute and following 
through on the prior intention—despite the fact that values are less well 
served in the former—is troubling, and it seems to depend on the idea 
that there cannot be less rationality in the former if its particular choices 
or actions are no more contrary to reasons than actions in the latter. 
Perhaps, under repudiation, the problem is the way that the rationality 
of all the particular choices, as choices never contrary to reason, are 
generalized to a broader and more categorical assessment of the 
rationality of an overall course of action.  This, it will be recalled, was 
the problem we confronted earlier in our discussion of backwards 
induction.  While Broome’s careful analysis of normative requirements 
allows him to claim that there is more to practical rationality than acting 
according to (the balance of pro tanto) reasons, his unwillingness to 
privilege any particular method for resolving violations of these 
normative requirements exposes him to the possibility that a resolution 
can proceed just as rationally from back to front, as in the repudiation of 




a prior intention, as front to back, when the prior intention is actually 
carried out under a later derivative intention.  The result, I think, is no 
less paradoxical than what we saw under backwards induction.  One 
might have hoped that all this structural analysis of practical rationality 
would do more for us than this. 
And I think it can.  However, before showing what this might be, we 
need first to appreciate why Broome might be concerned about labeling 
the repudiation of a prior intention as irrational.  Consider the following 
sort of example, which Broome discusses briefly in another context 
before he developed his analysis of the difference between reasons and 
the normative requirements of practical rationality.30  Suppose that you 
have good reason to choose to drop in on a friend, Mrs. Silstein, on the 
way home from work.  She is an elderly widow, on her own, and would 
love a visit from you.  On the other hand, you really do not want to 
spend the whole evening with her (perhaps there is something on 
television that you do not want to miss).  So the best plan of action, a 
plan that most satisfies all your reasons for acting, is to form the 
intention to stay only a short time and be resolute in carrying out this 
intention.  Call this course of action Resolute (R).  However, you know 
that, once there with Mrs. Silstein, you will want to stay and keep her 
company, with the result that you will give up the whole evening (and 
your television show).  Call this course of action Stay (S).  So, on the 
way to seeing her, you repudiate your prior intention to visit with her 
and head straight for home.  Call this course of action Home (H).  This 
appears to be the best that you can do for yourself given your current 
preferences and what you think is possible for you to do rationally. 
Broome recognizes that it is tempting to label the resolute course of 
action R as more rational than the course of action H involving 
repudiation.  By being resolute, you can achieve everything of value in 
being home and something of value in being there for your friend.  The 
repudiation of the prior intention sacrifices the latter possibility 
completely, something which is contrary to the reasons that you have at 
the moment of the prior intention (when you rank the different courses 
of action in the order, from left to right, RHS) and at the moment when 
you are actually visiting (when you would rank them SRH).31  So, while 
 30. John Broome, Book Review, 102 ETHICS 666, 666–67 (1992) (reviewing 
EDWARD F. MCCLENNEN, RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE (1990)). 
 31. Of course, when you are actually visiting your friend, course of action H is not 
actually available any more.  But it is still sensible to say, at that point, that you rank the 
course of action that repudiates the possibility of visiting as worst of all (“How awful it 
would have been not to have had this time together!”).  It is useful to compare these 
rankings (RHS and SRH) with those presented in the problem posed by Amartya Sen in 
his theorem on the “impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.”  See Amartya Sen, The 
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 152–57 (1970).  Sen showed 
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reasons and commensurable values are in play here in a way that they 
were not in the Abraham and Isaac example, there seems to be the same 
kind of irrationality in repudiating one’s prior intention here as there was 
in that example.  But this is where Broome offers a powerful objection.  
While Broome felt that, in the face of incommensurable values and the 
absence of reasons to choose one incommensurable option rather than 
another, there was no irrationality in Abraham either resolutely holding 
to his prior intention or repudiating it, in the Mrs. Silstein example he 
argues that there would be irrationality in being resolute and not 
repudiating the prior intention.  Consider what he says: 
   I think that resolute action is irrational.  Having dropped in on Mrs. Silstein, 
what reason can you possibly have for leaving?  You do not want to, and 
nothing would be gained by doing so.  If you have a reason, it must be that your 
original decision to leave early, made before you entered the house, supplies 
one by itself.  The reason you had for making this decision—that at the time you 
preferred leaving early to staying—is defunct, now that you have changed your 
preferences.  If resolute action is rational, then, the bare fact of having decided 
to do something must in itself be a reason for doing it.  But it is plainly not.  
Suppose that your original decision resulted from a false belief: suppose that, on 
entering the house, you find that Mrs. Silstein needs your company more than 
you expected.  Or suppose that, when you decided, you did not realize that you 
would later change your preferences; you simply change your mind in an 
ordinary way.  In both these cases, you should stay with Mrs. Silstein, and in 
neither would the bare fact of having made the opposite decision constitute even 
the weakest reason for leaving early.  No more does it in the original example.32
Much in this objection anticipates Broome’s later analysis, already 
discussed here, that the mere fact of prior intentions, and even the 
reasons that we might have for forming them, cannot provide any 
reason, as opposed to normative requirements, for forming the 
corresponding derivative intentions and actually following through on 
that, for some configurations of preferences, the assignment of even the most minimal 
powers of decisiveness (or rights) to two (or more) different individuals might mean the 
violation of the Pareto principle (or lead to an outcome where all the individuals are 
worse off than they could otherwise have been).  The same sort of problem arises in the 
Mrs. Silstein example under dynamic choice where, instead of two different individuals, 
we are dealing with only one individual, but one who has an early self and a later self 
with different preferences.  The later self (visiting with Mrs. Silstein) has the power (and 
a preference) to choose course of action S (staying on with Mrs. Silstein) over course of 
action R (resolutely leaving early); the early self, anticipating this choice by the later 
self, has the power (and a preference) to choose course of action H (repudiating any visit 
with Mrs. Silstein) over course of action S.  The result is course of action H, a course of 
action that both the early and later selves consider inferior to course of action R.  Thus, 
we end up with a Pareto inferior outcome, for some a (socially) irrational result. 
 32. Broome, supra note 30, at 668. 




them with actions.  As Broome suggests, without any reason not to, you 
are always free to change your mind.  And given his more recent 
analysis of the normative requirements of practical rationality, you 
change your mind deliberatively and rationally by repudiating your prior 
intention. 
However, despite what Broome says in the last sentence of this 
passage, there are important differences between the original example 
and the close variations on it that he discusses in the course of making 
his point in favor of the rationality of repudiation.  The differences turn 
out to be important once one has taken on the idea that normative 
requirements, as well as reasons, play a role in practical rationality.  
Consider again the original example.  In that example, at the time you 
form your prior intention to be resolute (adopting course of action R), 
you anticipate and deliberate over the possibility that, when you are 
visiting with Mrs. Silstein at the later time, you will want to stay rather 
than leave early.  Yet, in the face of that fully anticipated possibility, 
you, nevertheless, form the intention or plan to be resolute.  Of course, 
you do so with good reason (namely, that resolute action seems to allow 
you to satisfy both your prior preferences for an evening at home and 
something of your preferences, before and after this point, for spending 
some time with Mrs. Silstein), but the rationality of now following 
through on this prior intention, in the face of contrary reasons that you 
had fully anticipated would arise, is not reason-based.  That it could not 
be is Broome’s constant point in emphasizing the logical distinction 
between reasons and the normative requirements of practical rationality.  
However, following through on the prior intention could be normatively 
required. 
Now, Broome will say that the normative requirements of practical 
rationality, being relative, do not require any follow through in the 
consequent derivative intention (and action under that derivative 
intention).  It is just as consistent with these normative requirements, 
and, therefore, just as practically rational, to abandon any consequent 
derivative intention (and action) so long as one repudiates the antecedent 
prior intention.  But what reason is there to do the latter?  Broome’s 
variations on the original example suggest new considerations that might 
provide a reason.  For example, “you find Mrs. Silstein needs your 
company more than you expected,”33 or “you did not realize you would 
later change your preferences [and] you simply change your mind in an 
ordinary way.”34  Of course, on these variations, the changes in the 
situation might well give you a reason to repudiate your prior intention.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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You did not think of these possibilities in advance, and it would be 
almost thoughtlessly mechanical to go ahead with the prior intention 
without allowing these new possibilities to have some sort of rational 
impact on what you should do.  But in the original example there are no 
such surprises for you.  The situation, complete with the reasons that you 
now have for wanting to stay longer with Mrs. Silstein, has unfolded 
exactly as you anticipated it would when you formed your prior 
intention or plan.  How, therefore, can there be any reason, not already 
contemplated and accounted for under that prior intention or plan, to 
change your course of action?  Surely, there is only the normative 
requirement to carry out the course of action, as it was planned or 
intended, for exactly the sort of circumstances (including the reasons 
that you now have for staying) that arose. 
Attending to this difference between the original example and its 
variations does require you to attend to some of the content of what you 
intended and, more specifically, what you contemplated under the prior 
intention.  You need to do this to know whether the prior intention 
unambiguously applies to the situation as it arises at the time of forming 
the derivative intention and acting on it.  This may even have you 
considering what was thought to be the balance of reasons at the 
moment of this prior intention—for example, that on balance you 
thought they favored leaving Mrs. Silstein early even though you knew 
that, at the time of the visit, you would want to stay.  But, when this sort 
of content for your prior intention is brought forward into the situation 
where carrying out the prior intention is at issue, it is not that the reasons 
qua reasons are being carried forward to that point.  Again, that would 
be to fail to appreciate Broome’s essential point about the difference 
between reasons and the normative requirements of rationality.  Rather, 
when the content of the prior intention, and even the balance of reasons 
that make up this content, is brought forward into the actual choice 
situation, it is only to apply correctly, and accurately, the normative 
requirements of practical rationality, not the original reasons for the 
prior intention. 
This is an important difference made possible by Broome’s logical 
distinction between reasons and the normative requirements of practical 
rationality.  For if (contrary to Broome’s argument) the reasons themselves 
were brought forward, then they would be the sort of thing that was 
accessible to the claim that those reasons are now defunct or no longer 
apply as reasons in exactly the way that Broome suggests in the above 
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passage.  However, if they come forward as a content for the application 
of a prior intention, not yet repudiated (or defunct) and, given their 
content, if they account already for all reasons that might otherwise have 
called for such a repudiation, then all that remains unaccounted for is the 
satisfaction of the normative requirements of rationality in the actual 
doing of what one has intended—even, it should be noted, if one has (an 
anticipated) reason not to do what one has intended. 
This last point is the crucial one for the final application of this 
analysis to the problems uncovered in the last section when we looked 
into the centipede game and the problem of promising.  For there the 
promisor, faced with playing the centipede game, seemed to be caught 
by the fact that, while he had a reason to make the promise to take only 
one coin, and the same reason to intend to carry out that promise, he also 
had a reason not to carry it out.  And, if he knew that he had a reason not 
to carry it out, he would know, on the argument that reduced rationality 
to never acting contrary to (the balance of) reasons, that he could not 
intend to carry it out.  This seemed to render the whole practice of 
promising worthless to him. 
But suppose, as this Part of the Article (following Broome) has argued, 
that there is more to practical rationality than acting in accordance with (the 
balance of) reasons.  Suppose in particular that there is the practical 
rationality of acting under normative requirements as well.  Then there 
would be the possibility of forming an intention to do what one has 
reason not to do.  More specifically, one could form the intention to 
carry out a promise that one has reason not to carry out.  But now 
suppose further (contrary to what Broome seems to allow) that the 
content of this intended promise was such that it anticipated and 
accounted for the very consideration that is proposed as a reason for not 
carrying it out as intended.  The promisor, in other words, is well aware, 
at the moment that he forms his prior intention, that he will have (some 
particular balance of) reasons to renege on the promise that he makes.  
And yet he makes the promise, with the full intention of carrying it out.  
Then, on the analysis provided in this Part, the (balance of) reasons not 
to carry out the promise, having already been accounted for under the 
intention to form the promise, would only have a place under the 
normative requirements of rationality to carry out the promise that one 
has intended (at least, if one has, in fact, formed the prior intention to 
carry out the promise, and only so long as one has not repudiated this 
prior intention).  These reasons would not, in other words, act as further 
independent reasons for not carrying out the promise because these 
reasons have already been anticipated and comprehended within the 
prior intention that forms the basis for applying the normative 
requirements of practical rationality.  But without any independent 
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reason not to do as one has intended, and without any independent 
reason to repudiate that prior intention, there is only the normative 
requirement to carry out the promise as intended.  Thus, there can be 
practical rationality in carrying out a promise that one has made, and 
might have had reason to make, even if one has (a balance of) reasons 
not to carry it out.  The key is that the (balance of) reasons for not 
carrying out the promise must be anticipated and accounted for under the 
prior intention.35
Broome is correct, however, to challenge the rationality of not 
repudiating one’s prior intention in the face of new unanticipated 
reasons for not doing as one has intended to do.  This is the force of the 
variations that he provides on the original Mrs. Silstein example.  To 
feel obliged, under the normative requirements of rationality, to do 
something that one has formed the prior intention to do, simply because 
as a matter of fact one has intended it, and even though new 
 35. It would also be important that the prior intention satisfy some sort of 
rationality requirement at the time it was formed.  An obviously irrational intention or 
plan, for example, should not oblige the agent to carry it out as a matter of normative 
requirement even if the circumstances ex post were exactly as they were anticipated ex 
ante.  Nor would such a rationality requirement on the prior intention be limited to the 
idea that the agent be better off if circumstances unfold as intended, or as anticipated, 
than she would be if no such intention or plan been adopted at all.  Such a requirement 
might be either too restrictive or not restrictive enough, depending on what set of 
anticipated circumstances the agent considered for the purposes of this comparison.  For 
example, under a threat of mutual annihilation, carrying out the threat seems irrational, 
even though, strictly, it might be normatively required if the threatened party simply acts 
in the very way that the threat contemplated.  The source of the irrationality, however, is 
in the making of such an extreme threat initially, even though, had the threat been 
successful in at least one of the ways the agent must have anticipated as possible, the 
agent (not having had to carry out the costly threat) would have been better off than she 
was not having made any threat at all.  Thus, this last welfare comparison is not restrictive 
enough.  One might be tempted to say in the alternative, therefore, that it is not rational 
to form an intention or plan, and to carry it out as normatively required, if carrying it out 
makes one worse off than would have been had the intention or plan not been adopted at 
all.  But this is too restrictive a comparison to make since it seems to preclude making 
some perfectly rational (more moderate) threats, at least if the carrying out of those 
threats can make the agent worse off than she was before making the threat.  It is 
obviously crucial, therefore, for the overall theory of rational commitment to have an 
account of what intentions or plans it is rational to adopt.  For excellent analysis of this 
point, see Joe Mintoff, Rational Cooperation, Intention, and Reconsideration, 107 ETHICS 
612, 635–42 (1997).  The purpose of this Article, however, is only to emphasize that 
once such rational plans and intentions are adopted, it is also rational, as a matter of 
normative requirement, to carry them out, at least if they are not repudiated for some 
unanticipated pro tanto reason, and even if doing so is contrary to the balance of fully 
anticipated pro tanto reasons. 




considerations have arisen which suggest that there are now reasons not 
to do as one intended, does seem irrational.  Indeed, it seems closed 
minded and mechanical rather than rational.  Someone who has formed a 
prior intention to do something after a careful consideration of certain 
consequences might well feel rational in following through on this 
intention, even if the already considered consequences are of the kind 
that now give reasons not to do as one has intended.  That is simply to 
feel the normative requirements of practical rationality.  However, 
someone who allows the prior formation of such an intention to blind 
him to any new reasons that might countervail the prior intention is 
blocking out another component of practical rationality—namely, the 
independent reasons that one has for action at any point in time.  While 
it is a mistake to think that all of practical rationality is action according 
to the balance of reasons (or the balance of preference based on reasons), 
a common mistake that Broome corrects with his analysis of normative 
requirements, it is also a mistake to think that (at any moment calling for 
action) all of practical rationality is action according to normative 
requirements.  A full account of practical rationality must comprehend 
both the rationality of following through on one’s prior intentions, even 
though there may arise (fully anticipated) reasons for abandoning those 
intentions, and the rationality of always being open to the repudiation of 
these prior intentions in the face of new, truly independent (unanticipated) 
reasons.  This is the full account of rationality that is allowed for by 
Broome’s analysis, and it is an account of rationality that, even in the 
face of countervailing reasons, allows a rational agent to follow through 
on rational commitments, or promises, rationally made.36
IV. DEFEASIBLE LEGAL RULES 
The argument to this point has been complicated by the presence of 
some quite subtle theoretical distinctions.  For example, there appears to 
be an important difference between reasons and practical rationality.  
While reasons are an important part of practical rationality, they are not 
its whole.  There are also the normative requirements of practical rationality 
 36. While it is not the purpose of this paper to develop this point in any detail, it is 
tempting to speculate that when something unexpected comes up that provides the agent 
with an independent pro tanto reason against carrying out some prior intention, then the 
agent should weigh these new reasons against the balance of reasons that she had for 
adopting the prior intention and carrying it out in the first place.  Of course, this does mean 
that in this unexpected new circumstance, previously accounted for reasons are being 
reconsidered.  What is not permitted under a rational commitment is the reconsideration of 
previously accounted for reasons when circumstances develop exactly as expected.  
Again, I am grateful to Wlodek Rabinowicz for raising this point and encouraging me to 
consider it. 
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to be accounted for, and these are logically distinct from reasons. 
Normative requirements are strict, but relative, whereas reasons hold 
only pro tanto, but are independent.  Further, for reasons themselves, 
there is an important separation between the different moments in which 
we can have reasons within a single decision process.  We can (on 
balance) have reasons to choose or intend to do something that (on 
balance) we have reason not to do. 
These subtleties, while interesting theoretically, might make us question 
whether there really could be any such form of rational decisionmaking 
in practice.  However, in this Part of the Article, I want to argue that this 
form of rational decisionmaking is more than a mere theoretical construct.  
The institutionalization of this form of decisionmaking should be familiar 
to legal theorists as something that they study every day.  The conjunction 
of reasons and the normative requirements of practical rationality, I 
suggest, is to be found in any system of defeasible legal rules.  I will 
focus specifically on common law adjudication to make my point. 
A system of common law is more than a mere list of all the decisions 
that judges have chosen to impose upon litigants.  It is also comprised of 
the legal rules which are said to bring order to these different results.  Of 
course, within the common law method of adjudication, these rules do 
not typically appear in some preexisting authoritative text, like the rules 
of a tax code.  Rather, they develop over time in the cases—sometimes 
abruptly, more often gradually—as the general rules of, for example, tort 
or contract law.  This might suggest that the general rules are mere 
descriptions of the behavioral regularities of judges.  After all, if they do 
not preexist the cases, then the only other option seems to be that the 
rules come into place as rationalizations for what has actually been done 
for some independent reason in the particular case. 
Now, it is certainly true that, like the laws of science, rules of law 
bring order and understanding to a legal reality which is independently 
laid down and which can be the object of external and scientific 
observation, the stuff of induction.  But, more than this, rules of law are 
also said to bring order to a judge’s self-conscious understanding of 
what she does and, further, of what she feels she ought to do.  Rules, it is 
said, help to provide particular justifications for the legal result that she 
comes to in a case.  Rules, therefore, can be said to order the law from 
both an external ex post point of view (the point of view of the scientific 
observer) and from an internal ex ante point of view (the point of view 
of a committed participant or judge guided by rules in the legal decisions 





However, that legal rules have this double aspect suggests that there 
will be some ambiguity as to what the proper relationship should be 
between these rules of law and their apparent instantiations in the cases.  
Under the more descriptive, scientific account, the particular case sets 
the standard for the rule.  A rule will fail as a description, or fail to provide a 
proper understanding, insofar as it is an inaccurate representation of what is 
going on in the case.  Although a limited number of exceptions can 
sometimes be said to prove the rule (since that is what the very idea of 
an exception presupposes), too many will be fatal to its descriptive 
claim. 
On the other hand, under the more prescriptive account—where rules 
are said to provide reasons or justifications for judges to decide cases 
one way rather than another—the relationship between a case and the 
applicable rule is reversed.  Now, the rule sets the standard for the case.  
Moreover, because the rule has this seeming autonomy from the cases, it 
can pronounce almost any number of them as wrongly decided.  The 
number of such decisions only attests to the frequency of judicial error, 
leaving the legal rule intact and still perfectly capable of governing other 
cases. 
To accommodate this dual aspect of common law rules, what is 
required is an account that allows the rules to be strong enough to guide 
judicial decisionmaking in particular cases, but not so strong that it does 
not allow for the possibility that these same rules might require revision 
in the light of these same cases.  This might suggest that what we are 
looking for is something quite banal—namely, an account of rules that 
merely weighs the good that they do as rules (say, in securing general 
expectations, making life more predictable, controlling harmful judicial 
discretion, etc.) against the independent good that can be done by 
revising or abandoning the rule in some particular case.  But I want to 
press the intuitive point that a rule, and the following of a rule, is more 
strict (or “rule-like”) than this balancing or weighing metaphor allows.  
Borrowing from the above analysis, I want to now argue that a rule can 
normatively require a particular result in some case without regard to the 
good that is achieved in, or frustrated by, that result so long as this good 
(and its possible frustration) has already been anticipated by the rule and 
is accounted for in it.  But a good that is frustrated by that result can also 
be an independent reason, even a decisive independent reason, for not 
following the normative requirements of a rule.  A reason would be 
independent in the required sense if it involved a good that was not 
 37. For discussion of the importance of this internal point of view for the 
committed participant in law, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55 (1961). 
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anticipated by the rule and accounted for in it.  Thus, the integration of 
normative requirements of practical rationality and independent reasons 
promises to provide the right combination of rule respect and rule denial 
that is required if we are properly to accommodate the essential roles that 
rules and cases each play within a theory of common law decisionmaking. 
This way of integrating the normative requirements of practical 
rationality with independent reasons is familiar enough to those who 
understand the common law as a system of defeasible rules.  Mention of 
defeasibility, of course, reminds us of H.L.A. Hart, as Hart was influential 
in introducing the idea of defeasibility into legal theory.38  Borrowing 
the idea from the law of property, Hart noted that “a legal interest . . . is 
subject to termination or ‘defeat’ in a number of different contingencies 
but remains intact if no such contingencies mature.”39  Although he 
believed that this idea, or more particularly the dual structure of this 
idea, had wide application in the law, Hart developed the idea most 
explicitly with reference to the concept of a contract.  He might equally 
have referred to a rule of contract formation.  For Hart, as much as for 
other legal scholars, there is the usual list of positive conditions required 
for the existence of a valid contract (e.g., two parties, an offer by one, its 
acceptance by the other, consideration on both sides).  However, 
knowledge of these conditions does not, according to Hart, give us a full 
understanding of the concept of contract nor of the rule of contract 
formation.  We also need to know the various ways in which the claim 
that there is a contract (under the concept or the rule) can be defeated.  
Such defenses to the claim might include, for example, that there was 
fraudulent misrepresentation, duress, or lunacy.  Hart argued, therefore, that 
the concept or rule of contract formation was best captured structurally as a 
list of conditions that are normally necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a valid contract, together with a series of “unless” clauses 
that spell out the conditions under which this existence claim is defeated.  
However, Hart recognized that the list of unless clauses could not, in all 
likelihood, be exhaustively specified.  And so, such a rule would often 
end only (and perhaps only implicitly) with the word “unless. . . .”  
However, Hart was clear: “A rule that ends with the word ‘unless . . .’ is 
still a rule.”40  Specifically, it is a defeasible legal rule. 
 38. H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibilities and Rights, in ESSAYS ON 
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 145, 145–66 (Antony Flew ed., 1951). 
 39. Id. at 148. 
 40. HART, supra note 37, at 136. 




Now Hart’s idea of a defeasible legal rule meets either with 
enthusiastic acceptance (amongst legal realists41) or outright skepticism 
(amongst legal formalists42) because of the flexibility that it appears to 
allow around the rigidity of rules.  Here, I want to focus on the skeptical 
view, best articulated by Frederick Schauer.43  Schauer argues effectively 
that the best interpretations of Hart’s defeasibility claim either reduce his 
unless clauses to components of the rule, in which case there is only a 
relatively straightforward rule-like application of what is now a more 
complicated rule, or they allow the independent force of the unless 
clauses to modify the rule in light of some background justifications of 
the rule, in which case the background justifications are all that really 
apply and the force of the rule qua rule simply disappears.44  This is to 
reduce a defeasible legal rule either to a rule without defeasibility or to 
defeasibility without a rule. 
To make his point, Schauer considers seven possible interpretations of 
defeasibility.  The first four advance variations on the way in which the 
unless clause in the rule can be incorporated into the rule, albeit with 
varying degrees of difficulty.  For example, in the most simple case, it 
may only be that an unless clause is used expressly because some more 
convenient technical term or phrase (one that simply defines the conduct 
and incorporates the limiting idea within the definition without any use 
of the word unless) is not available.45  Schauer rightly dismisses this as a 
“trivial linguistic point;”46 there is no extensional difference in the 
application of two rules that are merely being expressed in these two 
different ways.  Likewise, Schauer argues that a version of defeasibility 
that simply recognizes that any rule or principle, including legal rules, 
might be subject to some sort of override in the face of an overwhelming 
moral obligation cannot be what Hart was suggesting.  Again, these 
overriding concerns could be quite conventionally incorporated into the 
rule by adding a closed-ended list of the relevant factors.  Of course, it 
might be that these factors are only specifiable in the rule in some quite 
general way, as some broad type of consideration rather than something 
very particular.  But this inability to pre-specify (under a more fully 
articulated rule) the full extension of the potentially overriding 
 41. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 
834–35 (1988). 
 42. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Defeasibility of Legal Rules, 51 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 223, 223–40 (1998). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 226–27; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 212–15 
(1991) (discussing same). 
 45. Schauer, supra note 42, at 227–28. 
 46. Id. at 227. 
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conditions (something Schauer calls “weak non-specifiability”47) is really 
no different from the inability to pre-specify the primary prescription 
under the rule for lack of an available technical term. 
The first four interpretations by Schauer of Hart’s defeasibility claim 
are the ones, therefore, that attempt to reduce defeasible legal rules to 
rules (albeit more complicated rules) without any significant defeasibility.  
If these were all that Hart meant to capture by advancing his claim, then 
Schauer would be correct to be skeptical.  More interesting are Schauer’s 
next three interpretations of Hart’s claim, interpretations that resist the 
possibility of writing the defeating consideration into the rule.  Under 
Schauer’s analysis of these interpretations, a defeasible legal rule is reduced 
to a constant state of defeasibility in the light of particular considerations 
within the case.  The result, says Schauer, is that rules qua rules disappear, 
being replaced by the direct application of the background justifications 
with respect to which the rules were thought to be instrumental. 
Schauer begins this discussion with a reference to what he calls 
“strong non-specifiability,”48 by which he means (in contrast to the weak 
form discussed above) an inability to specify, even by broad type, the 
sorts of conditions that might arise which would defeat a legal rule.  
Then, Schauer offers the following interpretation of defeasibility: “A 
rule is defeasible when its application is contingent not only upon the 
non-occurrence of events specifiable in advance by particular or type, 
but also by the non-occurrence of conditions specifiable in advance 
neither by particular nor by type.”49
Schauer is careful to consider two possibly different sorts of situations 
where there might be such an unanticipated event or condition.  First, 
there could be an event or condition that, while not precisely anticipated, 
clearly lies within both the linguistic contours of the primary rule and 
the contours of the rule’s background justification.  In that case, says 
Schauer, the rule is “simply applied, for the question of defeat does not 
arise when . . . language and purpose both encompass [the] case, even if 
it is not a case that has previously been imagined.”50  Schauer seems to 
think that this is not a very interesting case, although it looks to be a 
situation where the rule continues to operate as a rule.  This appears to 
be because he thinks the rule is doing no real normative work here; 
 47. Id. at 231. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 232 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. 




everything is being done by a direct application of the justification or 
purpose that the rule serves and which, in this first sort of situation, is in 
agreement with what the rule requires.  We shall have reason to return to 
this point in a moment. 
The second sort of situation is one that Schauer thinks is more 
interesting.  Here, the unanticipated event lies within the linguistic 
contours of the rule, but outside its background justification.  Yet, says 
Schauer: 
[I]f any consistency between the rule (as formulated) and the result indicated by 
direct application of the rule’s background justification is a sufficient condition 
for non-application of the rule, then the rule prohibits no action not prohibited 
by the background justification. . . .  [A]ll of the normative work is being done 
by the justification and none by the rule.51
Combine this result with Schauer’s understanding of the very limited 
role that a rule plays in the first sort of situation, where rule and 
background justification happened to agree, and the rule seems to 
disappear for all practical purposes in all possible situations.  Thus 
Schauer concludes: “If defeasibility is purchased at the cost of the rule 
itself, the cost is too high, at least for the purpose of maintaining, with 
Hart and his followers, that ruleness and strong defeasibility can co-
exist.”52
However, this conclusion is too strong for the argument, and our 
earlier analysis of practical rationality, which showed it as being 
comprised of both reasons and normative requirements, shows why.  
Schauer is right to claim (as in the first sort of situation) that, if some 
event (although not precisely anticipated) lies within the contours of the 
primary rule and its background justification or (to borrow from earlier 
terminology) the reasons that we might have for having the rule, then the 
 51. Id. at 232–33. 
 52. Id. at 233.  It should be remarked that Schauer does provide a final 
interpretation of Hart that saves something of the insight of the defeasibility claim, even 
for Schauer.  Schauer argues that the force of rules might be presumptive, in that they are 
subject to defeat by the existence of particularly powerful defeating conditions that 
cannot and need not be specified in advance, so long as the requirement of particular 
power can be specified in advance and is not itself subject to defeat.  This would allow 
the rule to carry some decisionmaking force up to some threshold point (the measure of 
which is itself nondefeasible), and before a direct application of the rule’s background 
justification takes over.  However, such an interpretation of defeasibility makes the 
choice between applying the rule and applying the background justification merely a 
quantitative matter.  But without providing a more qualitative or categorical distinction 
between the application of rules and the application of background justifications, there is 
the possibility, and danger, that this interpretation of defeasibility will collapse the 
former into the latter and the normativity of rules will again disappear into the 
particularity of an all-embracing defeasibility.  The categorical (logical) distinction 
between normative requirements and reasons that I suggest in this Article as a way to 
account for defeasible legal rules avoids this collapse. 
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rule is “simply applied.”  However, he is mistaken in thinking that we 
could just as easily apply the background justification directly in this 
sort of situation and, therefore, that the rule does no real normative 
work.  The rule does do its own normative work here, but it does so 
under the aspect of a normative requirement of practical rationality, and 
not under the direct application of the background justification, or 
independent reason, for the rule. 
The promising example, discussed earlier, makes this clear.  Suppose 
we had a rule for seeing to it that our promises were performed as 
intended.53  The reason or background justification for the rule might 
well be the welfarist one that we are better off performing our promise 
as intended than we would be if we made no such promise at all, and 
even if (we anticipate that) actually carrying out that promise makes us 
all worse off than we would be if we secured the benefits of making the 
promise and did not incur the costs of actually performing it.  This 
presents us, of course, with a familiar problem.  We have already seen 
that we might have a particular background justification or reason, 
which we can call reason W (for welfare), for intending to carry out a 
promise, or (now) having a promising rule, which can also furnish us 
with a reason not to follow the rule when the particular situation arises 
for carrying out the promise as previously intended.  Nevertheless, as a 
matter of normative requirement, we should follow, or “simply apply,” 
the rule because this is precisely the situation that was anticipated by the 
rule and was already accounted for in it.  Moreover, we properly 
(rationally) follow the rule in the particular case even though there is 
(now) some cost in terms of reason W (which provides the background 
justification for the rule) in doing so.  Thus, it is a mistake to think, as 
Schauer does, that, at the point where the rule is to be followed, we are 
simply appealing directly to the background justification. On that view, 
a view that (here) reduces practical rationality to acting in accordance 
with reason W, we would not follow the rule.  But we do follow the rule, 
and we follow it as a matter of normative requirement.  Further, we have 
no independent reason for not following the rule, having already 
anticipated and accounted for the countervailing consideration in terms 
of W within the rule itself. 
With the practical significance of a rule now once again secured, we 
 53. The promising example is discussed both by HART, supra note 37, at 136, and 
by Schauer, supra note 42, at 224. 
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have only to recognize that in Schauer’s second sort of situation, where 
some event occurs that appears to lie within the rule’s linguistic 
contours, but which was not anticipated under the reasons that provide 
for the rule’s background justification, there is an independent pro tanto 
reason for not following the rule.  After all, under this more purposeful 
(or contentful, reason-based) understanding of the rule, the rule simply 
does not apply and there is no normative requirement actually to follow 
it.  Indeed, there is only an independent reason for not following it, and 
for re-formulating the rule (perhaps with a further unless clause) in light 
of the new (unanticipated) pro tanto reason (or, perhaps, with a view to 
some new balance between new and old pro tanto reasons).  Thus, the 
combined application of normative requirements and independent 
reasons makes sense of Hart’s claim that both rules qua rules and the 
defeasibility of rules can sensibly be integrated into a full account of 
practical legal rationality.  And it also allows us to comprehend the idea, 
alluded to at the beginning of this section, that particular cases can, 
apparently simultaneously, both determine legal rules and be determined 
by them. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this Article I have argued that a full account of practical rationality, 
as being comprised of reasons and normative requirements, can make 
good sense of rationally following through on commitments rationally 
made.  Further, it can do so even if, in some circumstances, the balance 
of reasons is for not doing what you had reason to choose, intend, or 
promise to do.  I have tried to suggest that there is much advantage in 
this for a rational agent, although it would be a mistake, a rational 
mistake, for the agent to let the securing of this advantage be the reason 
for doing what she does.  In these circumstances, the agent should do 
what she has chosen, intended, or promised to do as a matter of 
normative requirement, not as a matter of reason.  This is not to say, of 
course, that the agent should follow through on her prior commitments 
in some blind, mechanical way, without a view to new and unanticipated 
considerations.  That, too, would be practically irrational; normative 
requirements are no more the whole of practical rationality than are 
reasons.  Rather, what she should do is follow through on her rational 
commitment, even in the face of countervailing reasons, unless some 
new independent reason, not already anticipated and accounted for under 
the rule, prompts her to reconsider that commitment. 
This suggests that a practically rational decisionmaker, at least in 
particular cases, will concern herself less with the substantive reason 
behind her prior rational commitment, at least qua reason, and more with 
CHAPMAN 4/7/2005  10:07 AM 
[VOL. 42:  91, 2005]  Rational Commitment and Legal Reason 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 127 
 
the reasons that might arise for narrowing or broadening her prior 
commitments in light of developing circumstances.  In other words, the 
practically rational decisionmaker will typically be working only on the 
margin of some more general rule adopted for application in the cases, 
pressing forward with it in the case unless she can be convinced that the 
case is unlike those she had already considered and anticipated under the 
rule.54
This, I have also tried to suggest, is precisely the sort of rationality 
that is manifested in common law adjudication.  Of course, judges will 
often have to attend to a purposeful (reason-based) interpretation of the 
rules that they seek to apply as a matter of normative requirement.  
Otherwise, they would not have a full sense of what the rule really is.  
But their purposeful application of the rule is formal, not substantive, the 
stuff of normative requirements rather than independent reasons.  They 
only address independent reasons when they are asked, typically by 
litigants, to either broaden or narrow the rule in light of special (novel) 
considerations arising in the particular case.  In this way, common law 
judges act in a rule-based way, although they are not rule-bound.  This is 
what Hart meant to capture in his idea of defeasible legal rules. 
One final cautionary note: while I think that the practical rationality 
that is manifested in a system of defeasible legal rules is the sort of 
rationality that might prove helpful for understanding why a rational 
agent can rationally follow through on commitments rationally made, I 
do not mean to suggest that common law adjudication is solving the sort 
of problem that plagues the rational choice theorist confronted with the 
paradox of backwards induction.  That paradox turns on there being a 
finite sequence of possible choices and the agent being able to look 
ahead to the end of that sequence from which the backwards induction 
begins.  The common law has no such finite horizon, or at least not one 
with such a predictable ending.  However, I do mean to suggest that the 
rational choice theorist can learn from a close study of the practical 
rationality that is manifested in common law adjudication.  Armed with 
an appreciation of the role that is played by reasons and normative 
requirements in practical rationality, the rational choice theorist will be 
in a better position to understand and design institutions for rational 
behavior more generally. 
 54. For further discussion of this idea, and how it relates substantive reason to the 
formal equality of treating like cases alike, see Bruce Chapman, Chance, Reason, and 
the Rule of Law, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 469, 477–89 (2000). 
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